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Abstract
We study the design of computationally efficient algorithms with provable guarantees, that are robust
to adversarial (test time) perturbations. While there has been an proliferation of recent work on this topic
due to its connections to test time robustness of deep networks, there is limited theoretical understanding
of several basic questions like (i) when and how can one design provably robust learning algorithms? (ii)
what is the price of achieving robustness to adversarial examples in a computationally efficient manner?
The main contribution of this work is to exhibit a strong connection between achieving robustness to
adversarial examples, and a rich class of polynomial optimization problems, thereby making progress on
the above questions. In particular, we leverage this connection to (a) design computationally efficient
robust algorithms with provable guarantees for a large class of hypothesis, namely linear classifiers
and degree-2 polynomial threshold functions (PTFs), (b) give a precise characterization of the price of
achieving robustness in a computationally efficient manner for these classes, (c) design efficient algorithms
to certify robustness and generate adversarial attacks in a principled manner for 2-layer neural networks.
We empirically demonstrate the effectiveness of these attacks on real data.
1 Introduction
The empirical success of deep learning has led to numerous unexplained phenomena about which our current
theoretical understanding is limited. Examples include the ability of complex models to generalize well and
effectiveness of first order methods on optimizing training loss. The focus of this paper is on the phenomenon
of adversarial robustness, that was first pointed out by Szegedy et al. [35]. On many benchmark data sets,
deep networks optimized on the training set can often be fooled into misclassifying a test example by making
a small adversarial perturbation that is imperceptible to a human labeler. This has led to a proliferation of
work on designing robust algorithms that defend against such adversarial perturbations, as well as attacks
that aim to break these defenses.
In this work we choose to focus on perturbation defense, the most widely studied formulation of adversarial
robustness [26]. In the perturbation defense model, given a classifier f , an adversary can take a test example
x generated from the data distribution and perturb it to x˜ such that ‖x− x˜‖ ≤ δ. Here δ characterizes the
amount of power the adversary has and the distance is typically measured in the `∞ norm (other norms that
have been studied include the `2 norm). Given a loss function `(·), the goal is to optimize the robust loss
defined as
E(x,y)∼D
[
max
x˜:‖x−x˜‖∞≤δ
`(f(x˜), y)
]
.
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One would expect that when δ is small the label y of an example does not change, thereby motivating the
robust loss objective. Despite a recent surge in efforts to theoretically understand adversarial robustness [38,
39, 40, 23, 32, 16, 4, 12, 19, 36, 27, 28, 13], several central questions remain open. How can one design
provable polynomial time algorithms that are robust to adversarial perturbations? Given a classifier and a
test input, how can one provably construct an adversarial example in polynomial time or certify that none
exists? What computational barriers exist when designing adversarially robust learning algorithms?
In this work we identify and study a natural class of polynomial optimization problems that are intimately
connected to adversarial robustness, and help us shed new light on all three of the above questions simultane-
ously! As a result we obtain the first polynomial time learning algorithms for a large class of functions that are
optimally robust to adversarial perturbations. Furthermore, we also provide nearly matching computational
intractability results that, together with our upper bounds give a sharp characterization of the price of
achieving adversarial robustness in a computationally efficient manner. We now summarize our main results.
Our Contributions Polynomial optimization and Adversarial Robustness. We identify a natural
class of polynomial optimization problems that provide a common and principled framework for studying
various aspects of adversarial robustness. These problems are also closely related to a rich class of well-studied
problems that include the Grothendiëck problem and its generalizations [2, 11, 1, 24]. Given a classifier of
the form sgn(g(x)) with g : Rn → R, input x, and budget δ > 0, the optimization problem is
max
z∈Rn:‖z‖∞≤δ
g(x+ z).
Usually, such problems are NP-hard and one relaxes them to find a zˆ such that g(x + zˆ) comes as close
to g(x+ z∗) in the objective value, where z∗ is the optimal solution. We instead require the algorithm to
output a zˆ such that g(x+ zˆ) ≥ g(x+ z∗) at the cost of violating the `∞ constraint by a factor γ ≥ 1. An
efficient algorithm for producing such a zˆ leads to an adversarial attack (in the relaxed `∞ neighborhood
of radius γδ) when an adversarial example exists. On the other hand, if the algorithm produces no ẑ, then
this guarantees that there is no adversarial example within the `∞ neighborhood of radius δ. We then
design such algorithms based on convex programming relaxations to get the first provable polynomial time
adversarial attacks when the given classifier is a degree-1 or a degree-2 polynomial threshold function (PTF).
Algorithms for Learning Adversarially Robust Classifiers. Next we use the algorithm for finding
adversarial examples to design polynomial time algorithms for learning robust classifiers for the class of
degree-1 and degree-2 polynomial threshold functions (PTFs). To incorporate robustness we introduce
a parameter γ, that helps clarify the tradeoff when computational efficiency is desired. We focus on the
0/1 error and say that a class F of PTFs of VC dimension ∆ is γ-approximately robustly learnable if there
exists a (randomized) polynomial time algorithm that, for any given ε, δ > 0, takes as input poly(∆, 1ε )
examples generated from a distribution and labeled by a function in F that has zero δ-robust error (realizable
case), outputs a classifier from F that has (δ/γ)-robust error upper bounded by ε. See Section 3 for the
formal definition. We design polynomial time algorithms for degree-1 and degree-2 PTFs with γ = 1 and
γ = O(
√
logn) respectively. Our next result that we discuss below a nearly matching lower bound. Together
this gives nearly optimal approximately robust polynomial time algorithms for learning PTFs of degree at
most 2.
Computational Hardness. While our algorithm for degree-1 PTFs is optimal, i.e., has γ = 1, for degree-2
and higher PTFs, we show that one indeed has to pay a price for computational robustness. We establish this
by proving that robust learning of degree-2 PTFs is computationally hard for γ = o(logc n), for some constant
c > 0 (see Section 6 for formal statements). This is in sharp contrast to the non-robust setting (δ = 0),
where there exist polynomial time algorithms for constant degree PTFs (in the literature this is referred
to as proper PAC learning in the realizable setting). More importantly, our lower bound again leverages
the connection to polynomial optimization and in fact shows that robust learning of degree-2 PTFs for
γ = o(√ηapprox) is NP-hard where ηapprox is precisely the hardness of approximation factor of a well-studied
combinatorial optimization problem called Quadratic Programming. Hence, any significant improvement in
the approximation factor in our upper bound is unlikely. While our hardness result applies to algorithms
that output a classifier of low error, we also prove a more robust hardness result showing that for learning
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degree-2 and higher PTFs without any loss in the robustness parameter, i.e, γ = 1, it is computationally hard
to even find a classifier of any constant error in the range (0, 14 ).
Application to Neural Networks. Finally, we show that the connection to polynomial optimization also
leads to new algorithms for generating adversarial attacks on neural networks. We focus on 2-layer neural
networks with ReLU activations. We show that given a network and a test input, the problem of finding
an adversarial example can also be phrased as an optimization problem of the kind studied for PTFs. We
design a semi-definite programming (SDP) based polynomial time algorithm to generate an adversarial attack
for such networks and compare our attack to the state-of-the-art attack of Madry et al. [26] on the MNIST
data set.
Paper Outline. In the rest of the paper, we give an overview of related work in Section 2. We define our
model formally and give an overview of our techniques in Section 3. We then describe the connection to
polynomial optimization in Section 4 and use it to design robust learning algorithms in Section 5, and derive
computational intractability results in Section 6. In Section 7, we design adversarial attacks for 2 layer neural
networks, followed by conclusions in Section 9.
2 Related Work
As mentioned in the introduction, there has been a recent explosion of works on understanding adversarial
robustness from both empirical and theoretical aspects. Here we choose to discuss the theoretical works that
are the most relevant to our paper. We refer the interested reader to a recent paper by [18] for a broader
discussion. Prior to their relevance for deep networks, robust optimization problems have been studied in
machine learning and other domains. The works of [7, 20, 33] studies optimization heuristics for optimizing
a robust loss that can handle noisy or missing data. The works of [38, 39] proved an equivalence between
robust optimization and various regularized variants of SVMs. They used this relation to re-derive standard
generalization bounds for SVMs and their kernel versions. Akin to classifier stability, these bounds depend
on the robustness of the classifier on the training set. A recent work of [8] views deep networks as functions
in an RKHS and designs new norm based regularization algorithms to achieve robustness.
Motivated by connections to deep networks a recent line of work studies generalization bounds for robust
learning. The work of [32] provides specific constructions of a linear binary classification task where a single
example is enough to learn the problem in the usual sense, i.e., to achieve low test error, whereas learning
the problem robustly requires a significantly large training set. The authors also show that in certain cases,
non-linearity can help reduce the sample complexity of robust learning. The work of [12] proposes a PAC
model for robust learning and defines adversarial VC dimension as a combinatorial quantity that captures
robust learning via robust empirical risk minimization (ERM). The authors show that for linear classifiers
the adversarial VC dimension is the same as the VC dimension, although there are functions classes and
distributions where the gap between the two quantities could be much higher. The recent works of [40]
and [23] analyze Rademacher complexity of robust loss functions classes. In particular, it is observed that
even for linear models with bounded weight norm, there is an unavoidable dependence on the data dimension
in the Rademacher complexity of robust loss function classes. These results point to the fact that for many
distributions robust learning could require many more training samples than their non-robust counterpart.
The work of [16, 4] studies algorithms and generalization bounds for a model where the adversary can choose
perturbations from a known finite set of small size k.
Another recent line of work studies the trade-off between traditional test error and robust error. The
work of [36] designs a classification task that is efficiently learnable with a linear classifier to low standard
error, but has the property that any classifier that achieves low test error will have high robust error on
the task. The work of [19] designs a task that is learnable by a degree-2 polynomial and relates the test
error of any model to its robust error. Similar conclusions have been observed in [27, 28, 13] and have been
used to design various data poisoning attacks. These results essentially follows from the use of isoperimetric
inequalities for distributions such as the Gaussian and the uniform distribution over the Boolean hypercube.
However, as noted in [19], it is not clear if the same relation holds between test error and robust error for
real world data distributions. The work of [15] relates robustness to the curvature of the decision boundary
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and uses it to quantify robustness to random perturbations.
Yet another line of work concerns the design of certificates of perturbation robustness or distributional
robustness of a given classifier (e.g., deep neural networks) at a given point [37, 31, 34]. This is achieved by
the use of convex relaxations of the optimal robustness at a given point. These works also conclude that
by augmenting the training objective with a penalty that depends on the certificates, one can empirically
achieve increased robustness. However these algorithms do not give any guarantees for relating the bound
achieved by the certificate of robustness to the optimal robustness around a given point.
The work of Bubeck et al. [9, 10] provides a cryptographic lower bound by designing a computational
task in Rn that is robustly learnable using poly(n) samples to any given robustness parameter M , but is
hard to learn robustly to any non-trivial robustness parameter ε > 0, in polynomial time. When translated
to our model, this provides an instance of a cryptographic learning task that is computationally hard to
γ-approximately robustly learn for any constant γ ≥ 1. However, this does not rule out the possibility that
natural function classes can be robustly learned without any loss in robustness parameter. Our result rules
this out for the class of degree-2 and higher PTFs, even in the realizable setting, i.e., when there exists a
robust classifier of zero error! Finally, to the best of our knowledge, our upper bounds are the first to establish
the robustness tradeoff for computationally efficient learning for a large natural class of functions.
3 Model and Preliminaries
We focus on binary classification, and adversarial perturbations are measured in `∞ norm. For a vector
x ∈ Rn, we have ‖x‖∞ = maxi |xi|. We study robust learning of polynomial threshold functions (PTFs).
These are functions of the form sgn(p(x)), where p(x) is a polynomial in n variables over the reals. Here sgn(t)
equals +1, if t ≥ 0 and −1 otherwise. Given y, y′ ∈ {−1, 1}, we study the 0/1 loss defined as `(y, y′) = 1 if
y 6= y′ and 0 otherwise. Given a binary classifier sgn(g(x)), an input x∗, and a budget δ > 0, we say that
x∗ + z is an adversarial example (for input x∗) if sgn(g(x∗ + z)) 6= sgn(g(x∗)) and that ‖z‖∞ ≤ δ. One could
similarly define the notion of adversarial examples for other norms. For a classifier with multiple outputs,
we say that x∗ + z is an adversarial example iff the largest co-ordinate of g(x∗ + z) differs from the largest
co-ordinate of g(x∗). We now define the notion of robust error of a classifier.
Definition 3.1 (δ-robust error). Let f(x) be a Boolean function mapping Rn to {−1, 1}. Let D be a
distribution over Rn × {−1, 1}. Given δ > 0, we define the δ-robust error of f with respect to D as
errδ,D(f) = E(x,y)∼D
[
supz∈Bn∞(0,δ) `(f(x + z), y)
]
. Here Bn∞(0, δ) denotes the `∞ ball of radius δ, i.e.,
Bn∞(0, δ) = {x ∈ Rn : ‖x‖∞ ≤ δ}.
Analogous to empirical error in PAC learning, we denote ˆerrδ,S(f) to be the δ-robust empirical error of f ,
i.e., the robust error computed on the given sample S. To bound generalization gap, we will use the notion of
adversarial VC dimension as introduced in [12]. Next we define robust learning for PTFs.
Definition 3.2 (γ-approximately robust learning). Let F be the class of degree-d PTFs from Rn 7→ {−1, 1}
of VC dimension ∆ = O(nd). For γ ≥ 1, an algorithm A γ-approximately robustly learns F if the following
holds for any ε, δ, η > 0: Given m = poly(∆, 1ε ,
1
η ) samples from a distribution D over Rn × {−1, 1}, if
F contains a function f∗ such that errδ,D(f∗) = 0, then with probability at least 1 − η, A runs in time
polynomial in m and outputs f ∈ F such that errδ/γ,D(f) ≤ ε. If F admits such an algorithm then we
say that F is γ-approximately robustly learnable. Here γ quantifies the price of achieving computationally
efficient robust learning, with γ = 1 implying optimal learnability.
A Note about the Model and the Realizability Assumption Our definition of an adversarial example
requires that sgn(g(x∗ + z)) 6= sgn(g(x∗)), whereas for robust learning we require a classifier that satisfies
sgn(g(x∗ + z)) 6= y, where y is the given label of x∗. This might create two sources of confusion to the reader:
a) In general the two requirements might be incompatible, and b) It might happen that initially sgn(g(x∗))
predicts the true label incorrectly but there is a perturbation z such that sgn(g(x∗ + z)) predicts the true
label correctly. In this case one may not count z as an adversarial example. To address (a) we would like
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to stress that all our guarantees hold under the realizability assumption, i.e., we assume that there is true
function c∗ such that for all examples x in the support of the distribution and all perturbations of magnitude
upto δ, sgn(c∗(x∗ + z)) = sgn(c∗(x∗)). Hence, there will indeed be a target concept for which no adversarial
example exists and as a result will have zero robust error. To address (b) we would like to point out that in
Section 5 where we use the subroutine for finding adversarial examples to learn a good classifier sgn(g), we
always enforce the constraint that on the training set sgn(g(x∗)) = sgn(c∗(x∗)) and g is as robust as possible.
Hence when we find an adversarial example for a point x∗ in our training set, it will indeed satisfy that
sgn(g(x∗ + z)) 6= sgn(c∗(x)) and correctly penalize g for the mistake. More generally, we could also define an
adversarial example as one where given pair (x∗, y) the goal is to find a z such that sgn(g(x∗+ z)) 6= y. All of
our guarantees from Section 4 apply to this definition as well. Finally, in the non-realizable case, the distinction
between defining adversarial robustness as either sgn(g(x∗ + z)) 6= sgn(g(x∗)), or sgn(g(x∗ + z)) 6= y, or even
sgn(g(x∗ + z)) 6= sgn(c∗(x)) matters and has different computational and statistical implications [13, 21].
Understanding when one can achieve computationally efficient robust learning in the non-realizable case is an
important direction for future work.
The definition of γ-approximately robustly learnability has the realizability assumption built into it. So,
when we prove that a class F is γ-approximately robustly learnable, we find an approximate robust learner
from F under the realizability assumption on F i.e. for a set of points from the distribution, the algorithm
guarantees to return an approximate robust learner only if there exists a perfect robust learner in the class F
of learners.
The work of [12] defines the notion of adversarial VC dimension to bound the generalization gap for
robust empirical risk minimization. Additionally, the authors show that for linear classifiers the adversarial
VC dimension remains the same as that of the original class. The bound below then follows by viewing PTFs
as linear classifiers in a higher dimensional space.
Lemma 3.3. Let F be a class of degree-d polynomial threshold functions from Rn 7→ {−1, 1} of VC
dimesion ∆ = O(nd). Given δ, η > 0, and a set S of m examples (x1, y1), . . . , (xm, ym) generated from a
distribution D over Rn×{−1, 1}, with probability at least 1−η, we have that supf∈F |errδ,D(f)− ˆerrδ,S(f)| ≤
2
√
2∆ logm/m+
√
log(1/η)/(2m).
4 Finding Adversarial Examples using Polynomial Optimization
In this section we introduce the broad class of polynomial optimization problems which are useful in designing
adversarial (test-time) examples with provable guarantees for polynomial threshold functions (PTFs), and
depth-2 neural networks with RELU gates. These polynomial optimization problems are generalizations of
well-studied combinatorial optimization problems like the Grothëndieck problem and computing operator norms
of matrices. We then design algorithms with provable guarantees for some of these classes. Proposition 4.1
restated below illustrates the connection and motivates the family of optimization problems that arise when
designing algorithms with provable guarantees for finding adversarial examples for sgn(g(x)). While our
theory below is stated for binary classifiers, it is easily extended to multiclass classification.
Proposition 4.1. Let γ ≥ 1. There is an efficient algorithm that given a classifier sgn(f(x)) and a point
x∗, and budget δ > 0, guarantees to either (a) find an adversarial example in Bn∞(x∗, γδ), or (b) certify the
absence of any adversarial example in Bn∞(x∗, δ), given access to an efficient optimization algorithm that takes
x∗ and a polynomial g(z) ∈ { f(x∗ + z),−f(x∗ + z) } as input and finds a ẑ such that g(ẑ) ≥ max‖z‖∞≤δ g(z)
with ‖ẑ‖∞ ≤ γδ.
Proof of Proposition 4.1. Let ALGγ be the optimization algorithm. Suppose there exists an adversarial
example x∗ + z∗ with ‖z∗‖∞ ≤ δ, and let y∗ := sgn(f(x∗)) be the label for the point x∗. Then we have that
maxz:‖z‖∞≤δ(−y∗)f(x∗ + z) > (−y∗)f(x∗ + z∗) > 0. Now for g(z) = −y∗f(x∗ + z) (a polynomial in z), we
get that ALGγ finds a point ẑ with ‖ẑ‖∞ ≤ γδ that also satisfies (−y∗)f(x∗ + ẑ) > 0 i.e., sgn(f(x∗)) 6=
sgn(f(x∗ + ẑ)), as required. Furthermore, if ALGγ fails, i.e., outputs a zˆ such that (−y∗)f(x∗ + ẑ) < 0, then
from the guarantee of the algorithm we know that maxz:‖z‖∞≤δ(−y∗)f(x∗ + z) < 0 and hence no adversarial
example exists within a δ ball around x∗.
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1. Given (A, b, c) that defines the polynomial g(z) := zTAz + bT z + c.
2. Solve the SDP given by following vector program:
max
∑
i,j Aij〈ui, uj〉+
∑
i bi〈ui, u0〉+ c subject to ‖ui‖22 ≤ δ2 ∀i ∈ [n], ‖u0‖22 = 1.
3. Let u⊥i represent the component of ui orthogonal to u0. Draw ζ ∼ N(0, I) a standard Gaussian
vector, and set ẑi := 〈ui, u0〉+ 〈u⊥i , ζ〉 for each i ∈ { 0, 1, . . . , n }.
4. Repeat rounding O(log(1/η)) random choices of ζ and pick the best choice.
Figure 1: The SDP-based algorithm for the degree-2 optimization problem.
The proposition above also holds for randomized algorithms. While the proof of the proposition only
requires that the algorithm returns ẑ with g(ẑ) > 0, it effectively requires that ẑ attains at least as large an
objective value because the constant term can be arbitrary. When the classifier is a degree-d PTF of the form
sgn(f), it leads to the following approximate optimization problem: given as input a degree d polynomial
g : Rn → R (potentially different from f) and any η, δ > 0, find in time poly(n, log( 1η )) and w.p. at least
1− η a point xˆ s.t.
g(xˆ) ≥ max
x∈Bn∞(0,δ)
g(x) and x̂ ∈ Bn∞(0, γδ). (1)
The above problem is closely related to the standard approximation variant of polynomial maximization
problem where the goal is to obtain, in polynomial time, an objective value as close to the optimal one,
without violating the ‖‖∞ ball constraint. Instead, our problem asks for the same objective value at the cost
of an increase in the radius of the optimization ball. 1 This changes the flavor of the problem, and introduces
new challenges particularly when the polynomial g is non-homogenous.
We begin with the following simple claim about degree-1 PTFs.
Claim 4.2. There is a deterministic linear-time algorithm that given any linear threshold function sgn(bTx+c),
a point x∗ and δ > 0, provably finds an adversarial example in the `∞ ball of δ around x∗ when it exists.
Proof. We use Proposition 4.1 applied with linear functions. For linear function g(x) represented by g(x) :=
bTx+ c where b ∈ Rn, c ∈ R, we can easily find a solution x̂ ∈ Bn∞(0, δ) such that g(x̂) = maxx∈Bn∞(0,δ) g(x).
This is because the linear form bTx+ c is maximized within Bn∞(0, δ) by setting each variable xi to be δ if
the corresponding bi ≥ 0, and −δ, otherwise.
As we will see in Section 5, this will further be used to give robust learning algorithms for linear threshold
functions. Our main theoretical result of this section gives an algorithm for provably finding adversarial
examples for degree-2 PTFs.
Theorem 4.3. For any δ, η > 0, there is a polynomial time algorithm that given a degree-2 PTF sgn(f(x))
and a example (x∗, sgn(f(x∗))), guarantees at least one of the following holds with probability at least (1− η):
(a) finds an adversarial example (x∗ + ẑ) i.e., sgn(f(x∗)) 6= sgn(f(x∗ + ẑ)), with ‖ẑ‖∞ ≤ Cδ
√
logn, or (b)
certifies that ∀z : ‖z‖∞ ≤ δ, sgn(f(x∗)) = sgn(f(x∗ + z)) for some constant C > 0.
To establish the above theorem using Proposition 4.1, we need to design a polynomial time algorithm
that given any degree-2 polynomial g(x) = xTAx+ bTx+ c with A ∈ Rn×n, b ∈ Rn, c ∈ R, finds a solution x̂
with ‖x̂‖∞ ≤ O(
√
logn) · δ such that g(x̂) ≥ max‖x‖∞≤δ g(x).
To prove the theorem we use a semi-definite programming (SDP) based algorithm shown in Figure 1, that
is directly inspired by the SDP-based algorithm for quadratic programming (QP) by [29, 11]. However, the
goal in quadratic programming is to find an assignment x ∈ {−1, 1 }n that maximizes ∑i 6=j aijxixj . There
are three main differences from the QP problem. Firstly, unlike QP which finds a solution with ‖x‖∞ = 1
with sub-optimal objective value, our goal is to output a solution which attains at least as large a value as
max‖x‖∞≤δ g(x) while violating the `∞ length of the vector. Secondly, unlike QP where the diagonal terms
are all 0, in our problem the diagonal terms can be non-zero and hence it is no longer true that the solution
1In approximation algorithms literature this will correspond to obtaining a (1, γ)-bicriteria approximation.
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with ‖x‖∞ ≤ 1 will have each co-ordinate being {±1 }. Finally and most crucially, QP corresponds to
optimizing a homogeneous degree 2 polynomial, with no linear term. These challenges necessitates non-trivial
modifications to the algorithm and in the analysis. We also remark that it seems unlikely that the upper
bound of O(
√
logn) on the approximation factor can be improved even for the special case of homogenous
degree-2 polynomials, based on the current state of the approximability of Quadratic Programming (see
Remark 4.5 for details).
The SDP we consider is given by the following equivalent vector program (the SDP variables correspond
to Xij = 〈ui, uj〉), which can be solved in polynomial time up to arbitrary additive error (using the Ellipsoid
algorithm).
max
{u0,u1,...,un }
n∑
i,j=1
Aij〈ui, uj〉+
n∑
i=1
bi〈ui, u0〉+ c (2)
s.t. ‖ui‖22 ≤ δ2 ∀i ∈ { 1, 2, . . . , n } , and ‖u0‖22 = 1. (3)
Let SDPval denote the optimal value of the above SDP relaxation. Clearly the above SDP is a valid relaxation
of the problem; for any valid solution x ∈ [−δ, δ]n, consider the solution given by (ui = xiu0 : i ∈ [n]) for
any unit vector u0. Hence SDPval ≥ max‖x‖∞≤δ g(x). Moreover, when the SDP value SDPval is negative,
this certifies that the classifier is robust around the give sample x∗. We prove Theorem 4.3 by designing
a polynomial time rounding algorithm that takes the SDP solution and obtained a valid zˆ satisfying the
requirements of the theorem.
Rounding Algorithm. Given the SDP solution, let u⊥i represent the component of ui orthogonal to u0.
Consider the following randomized rounding algorithm that returns a solution { x̂i : i ∈ [n] } :
∀i ∈ { 0, 1, . . . , n } , x̂i := 〈ui, u0〉+ 〈ui, ζ〉 = 〈ui, u0〉+ 〈u⊥i , ζ〉, with ζ ∼ N
(
0,Π⊥
)
, (4)
where Π⊥ is the projection matrix onto the subspace of span({u1, . . . , un }) that is orthogonal to u0. For
convenience, we can assume without loss of generality that u0 = e0, where e0 is a standard basis vector, and
ui ∈ Rn+1. Let e0, e1, . . . , en represent an orthogonal basis for Rn+1. Then
∀i ∈ { 0, 1, . . . , n } , x̂i = 〈ui, u0〉+ 〈u⊥i , ζ〉 where 〈ζ, e0〉 = 0, 〈ζ, v〉 ∼ N(0, ‖v‖22) for every v ⊥ e0,
and x̂0 = 1. The rounding algorithm just tries O(log(1/η)) independent random draws for ζ, and picks the
best of these solutions.
We now give the analysis of the algorithm. We prove Theorem 4.3 by showing the following guarantee for
the rounding algorithm.
Lemma 4.4. There is a polynomial time randomized rounding algorithm that takes as input the solution of
the SDP as defined in Equations 2, and 3, and outputs a solution x̂ such that
P
x̂
[
g(x̂) ≥ max
‖x‖∞≤δ
g(x) and ‖x̂‖∞ ≤ O(
√
logn) · δ
]
≥ Ω(1). (5)
Assuming (5), we can repeat the algorithm at least O(log(1/η)) times to get the guarantee of Theorem 4.3.
Proof of Lemma 4.4. We start with a simple observation that follows from the standard properties of spherical
Gaussians. For any i, j ∈ [n], we have Eζ [〈u⊥i , ζ〉〈u⊥j , ζ〉] = (u⊥i )TΠ⊥u⊥j = 〈u⊥i , u⊥j 〉. Hence we get the key
observation that for ∀i, j ∈ { 0, . . . , n },
E
[
x̂ix̂j
]
= E
ζ
[(
〈ui, u0〉+ 〈u⊥i , ζ〉
)(
〈uj , u0〉+ 〈u⊥j , ζ〉
)]
= 〈ui, u0〉〈uj , u0〉+ E
ζ
[
〈u⊥i , ζ〉〈u⊥j , ζ〉
]
= 〈ui, u0〉〈uj , u0〉+ 〈u⊥i , u⊥j 〉 = 〈ui, uj〉. (6)
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Note that this also holds when i = j. We now consider the expected value of g(x̂). Using (6), x̂0 = 1 and
since Eζ [〈u⊥i , ζ〉] = 0, we have
E[g(x̂)] =
n∑
i,j=1
Aij E
ζ
[
x̂ix̂j
]
+
n∑
i=1
bi E
ζ
[x̂ix̂0] + cE
ζ
[x̂20]
=
n∑
i,j=1
Aij〈ui, uj〉+
n∑
i=1
bi〈ui, u0〉+ c‖u0‖22 = SDPval. (7)
We now show that x̂i ≤ O(
√
logn) · δ w.h.p. For each fixed i ∈ { 1, . . . , n }, 〈u⊥i , ζ〉 is distributed as a
Gaussian with mean 0 and variance ‖u⊥‖22 ≤ δ2 ,
|x̂i| ≤ |〈ui, u0〉|+ |〈u⊥i , ζ〉| ≤ δ + |〈u⊥i , ζ〉| ≤
√
C logn · δ with probability at least 1− 1/nC/2,
using standard tail properties of Gaussians. Hence, using a union bound over all i ∈ [n], we have that
E[g(x̂)] ≥ max
‖x‖∞≤δ
g(x), and P
[
‖x̂‖∞ ≤ O(
√
logn) · δ
]
≥ 1− 1
n2
. (8)
for C ≥ 4. Further note that g(x̂) can be expressed a degree-d polynomial of the Gaussian vector ζ. Hence
using hypercontractivity of low-degree polynomials (Theorem 10.23 of [30]), we have
P
ζ
[
g(x̂) ≥ E
ζ
g(x̂)
]
≥ Ω(1).
Hence (5) follows.
Remark 4.5. Obtaining an approximation factor of O(γ) in the `∞ norm of zˆ, even for the special case
of homogeneous degree-2 polynomials
∑n
i<j=1 aijxixj with no diagonal entries (aii = 0 ∀i ∈ [n]) over
‖x‖∞ ≤ δ is equivalent to obtaining a O(γ2)-factor approximation algorithm for the problem called Quadratic
Programming (QP) which maximizes
∑n
i<j=1 aijxixj over x ∈ {−1, 1 }n (this is also called the Grothendieck
problem on complete graphs). The best known approximation algorithm for Quadratic Programming (QP)
gives an O(logn)-factor approximation in polynomial time [29, 11]. Further [3] showed that it is hard to
approximate QP within a O(logc n) for some universal constant c > 0 assuming NP does not have quasi-
polynomial time algorithms. Moreover integrality gaps for SDP relaxations [1, 25] suggest that O(logn) factor
maybe be tight for polynomial time algorithms. Hence even for the special case of homogeneous degree-2
polynomials, improving upon the bound of
√
logn in the approximation factor seems unlikely.
5 From Adversarial Examples to Robust Learning Algorithms
In this section we will show how to leverage the algorithms for finding adversarial examples to design
polynomial time robust learning algorithms for various sub-classes of Polynomial Threshold Functions (PTF).
In particular, these include general degree-1 and degree-2 polynomial threshold functions. We obtain our
upper bounds by establishing a general algorithmic framework that relates robust learnability of PTFs to the
polynomial maximization problem studied in Section 4.This is formalized in the definition below:
Definition 5.1 (γ-factor admissibility). For γ ≥ 1, we say that a sub-class F of PTFs is γ-factor admissible
if F has the following properties:
1. For any a, b, c ∈ R, sgn(f(x)), sgn(g(x)) ∈ F , sgn(af(x) + bg(x) + c) ∈ F .
2. For any b ∈ Rn and sgn(g(x)) ∈ F , we have that sgn(g(x+ b)) ∈ F .
3. There is a γ-admissible approximation for { g : sgn(g) ∈ F }.
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The first two conditions above are natural and are satisfied by many sub-classes of PTFs. The third
condition in the above definition concerns the optimization problem studied in Section 4. The main result of
this section, stated below, is the claim that any admissible sub-class of PTFs is also robustly learnable in
polynomial time.
Theorem 5.2. Let F be a sub-class of PTFs that is γ-factor admissible for γ ≥ 1. Then F is γ-approximate
robustly learnable.
Remark 5.3. While we state our upper bounds for perturbations measured in the `∞ norm, we would like to
point out that one can define analogously γ-factor admissibility for any `p norm and the above theorem will
still hold true with the new definition.
To learn a g ∈ F we formulate robust empirical risk minimization as a convex program, shown in Figure 2.
Here we use the fact that the value of any polynomial g of degree d at a given point x can be expressed as
the inner product between the co-efficient vector of g (denoted by coeff(g) ∈ RD) and an appropriate vector
ψ(x) ∈ RD where D = (n+d−1d ). Our goal is to find a polynomial g ∈ F that correctly classifies all the
training examples (xi, yi). This corresponds to the constraint yig(xi) > 0 expressed as yi〈coeff(g), ψ(x)〉 > 0,
a linear constraint in the unknown coefficients coeff(g) of the polynomial g. For example, if g(x) is a degree-2
polynomial of the form xTAx+ bTx+ c, then the constraint yig(xi) > 0 is linear in the unknown coefficients,
ai,j , bi and c, of the polynomial. Here ai,j corresponds to the (i, j) entry of the matrix A and bi is the ith
coordinate of vector b. We also want to ensure that g is robust around each point in the training set. These
two constraints together can be enforced by the convex program in Figure 2, where the ri’s are additional
variables apart from the coefficients of g. Note that the set of all g is convex because of condition 1 of
Definition 5.1. While constraints in (10) are linear in the variables and easy to implement, (11) is really
asking to check the robustness of g at a given point (xi, yi), which is an NP-hard problem [11]. Instead, we
will use the fact that F is γ-factor admissible to design an approximate separation oracle for the type of
constraints enforced in (11). We would like to mention that the classical literature on robust optimization of
linear and convex programs studies a similar setting where typically the goal is to bound the probability of
each constraint being violated while achieving the maximum objective value [5, 14, 6]. In contrast, we are
interested in precisely quantifying how much a constraint can be violated by and relate the bound to the
robustness of the final classifier obtained. We are now ready to prove the main theorem of this section.
Proof of Theorem 5.2. Let η > 0 be the success probability desired for the robust learning algorithm and
ε > 0 be the final robust error that is desired. Let B be an algorithm that achieves the γ-factor admissibility
for the class F . Given S, we will run the Ellipsoid algorithm on the convex program in Figure 2. Let
T (m,n) be a (polynomial) upper bound on the number of iterations of the algorithm. In each iteration, given
g, r1, r2, . . . , rm, we will first check whether yig(xi) > ri. If not, then we have found a violated constraint
with the corresponding separating hyperplane being sgn(ri − yig(xi)), and the algorithm proceeds to the
next iteration. If all the constraints in (10) are satisfied, then for each i ∈ [m], we run B on the polynomial
yi(g(xi)− g(xi + z)), where z is the variable and xi is fixed to be the ith data point. Furthermore, we will set
η′, the failure probability of B, to be equal to η/(mT (m,n)) and set δ′ that is input to B to be δ/γ. From
the guarantee of B we get that if there exists an i such that
ri < sup
z∈Bn∞(0, δγ )
yi
(
g(xi)− g(xi + z)
)
, (9)
with probability at least 1− η/T (m,n), the B will output a violated constraint of the convex program, i.e.,
an index i ∈ [m] and zˆ ∈ Bn∞(0, δ) such that
ri < sup
z∈Bn∞(0,δ)
yi
(
g(xi)− g(xi + zˆ)
)
.
This gives us a separating hyperplane of the form sgn(yi(g(xi) − g(xi + zˆ)) − ri), and the algorithm
continues. Hence, we get that when the Ellipsoid algorithm terminates, with probability at least 1− η, it will
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1. Let S = (x1, y1), (x2, y2), . . . , (xm, ym) be the given training set.
2. Find a degree polynomial g ∈ F that satisfies
yig(xi) > ri, ∀i ∈ [m] (10)
ri ≥ sup
z∈Bn∞(0,δ)
yi
(
g(xi)− g(xi + z)
)
, ∀i ∈ [m] (11)
Figure 2: The convex program for finding a polynomial g ∈ F with zero robust empirical error.
output a polynomial g ∈ F such that the constraints in (10) and (9) are satisfied. This means that we would
have the empirical robust error ˆerrδ/γ,S(sgn(g)) = 0. Hence, by Lemma 3.3, we get that
errδ/γ,D(sgn(g)) ≤ 2
√
2∆ logm
m
+
√
log 1η
2m ,
where ∆ is the VC dimension of F . Choosing m = c∆+log(1/η)ε2 , makes errδ/γ,D(sgn(g)) ≤ ε.
It is easy to check that for any fixed d ∈ N, general degree-d PTFs satisfy conditions 1 and 2 of Definition 5.1
(however homogenous degree d polynomials do not satisfy condition 2). We conclude the section by stating
the following corollaries about robust learnability of general degree-1 and degree-2 PTFs.We begin with the
following claim about admissibility and hence robust learnability of degree-1 PTFs.
Corollary 5.4. The class of degree-1 PTFs is optimally robustly learnable.
The proof just follows from Claim 4.2 and since any linear combination or shift of a linear function is also
linear. Similarly, the following corollary about degree-2 PTFs is immediate from Theorem 4.3.
Corollary 5.5. The class of degree-2 PTFs is O(
√
logn)-approximately robustly learnable.
6 Computational Intractability of Learning Robust Classifiers
In this section, we leverage the connection to polynomial optimization to complement our upper bound with
the following nearly matching lower bound.We give a reduction from Quadratic Programming (QP) where given
a polynomial p(x) =
∑
i<j aijxixj , and a value s, the goal is to distinguish whether maxx∈{−1,1}np(x) < s
or whether exists an x such that p(x) > sηapprox. It is known that the distinguishing problem is hard for
ηapprox = O(logc n) for some constant c > 0 [3]; moreover the state-of-the-art algorithms give a ηapprox =
O(logn) factor approximation [11] and improving upon this factor is a major open problem. By appropriately
scaling the instance, this immediately implies the hardness of checking whether a given degree-2 PTF is
robust around a given point.
However, this does not suffice for hardness of learning, since given a distribution supported at a single
point, there is a trivial constant classifier that robustly classifies the instance correctly. More generally, there
could exist a different degree-2 PTF that could be easy to certify for the given point. Instead, given a
degree-2 PTF sgn(p(x)), we carefully construct a set of O(n2) points such that any classifier that is robust
on an instance supported on the set will have to be close to the given polynomial p. Having established this,
we can distinguish between the two cases of the QP problem by whether the learning algorithm is able to
output a robust classifier or not. This is formalized below.
Theorem 6.1. There exists δ, ε > 0, such that assuming NP 6= RP there is no algorithm that given a set of
N = poly(n, 1ε ) samples from a distribution D over Rn × {−1,+1}, runs in time poly(N) and distinguishes
between the following two cases for any δ′ = o(√ηapproxδ):
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• Yes: There exists a degree-2 PTF that has δ-robust error of 0 w.r.t. D.
• No: There exists no degree-2 PTF that has δ′-robust error at most ε w.r.t. D.
Here ηapprox is the hardness of approximation factor of the QP problem.
Remark 6.2. The above theorem proves that any polynomial time algorithm that always outputs a robust
classifier (or declares failure if it does not find one) will have to incur an extra factor of Ω(√ηapprox) in the
robustness parameter δ. Our upper bound in Section 5 on the other hand matches this bound. While our
lower bound applies to algorithms that output a classifier of low error, in Appendix (see Theorem 6.7) we
also prove a more robust lower bound that rules out the possibility of an efficient robust learner that incurs
an error less than 1/4.
We will represent an instance of Quadratic Programming (QP) by a polynomial p(x) = xTAx where A
is a symmetric matrix with zeros on the diagonal, and Aij = Aji = aij/2. Formally, the NP -hard problem
QP [3, 17] is the following: given β > 0 and a polynomial p(x) = xTAx distinguish whether
No Case : there exists an assignment x∗ ∈ {−1, 1 }n such that p(x∗) > βηapprox,
Yes Case : for every assignment x ∈ {−1, 1 }n, p(x) < β.
We prove that there exists a δ > 0 and a set of N = poly(n) points such that it is hard to distinguish
whether there exists a degree-2 PTF that is δ robust at all the points or that no degree-2 PTF is ηδ robust
for η = Ω(1/√ηapprox).
Theorem 6.3. [Hardness] There exists δ > 0, such that assuming NP 6= RP there is no polynomial time
algorithm that given a set of N = O(n2) labeled points { (x(1), y(1)), . . . , (x(N), y(N)) } with (x(j), y(j)) ∈
Rn+1 × {−1, 1 } for all j ∈ [N ] can distinguish between the following two cases
YES Case: There exists a degree-2 PTF that has δ-robust empirical error of 0 on these N points.
NO Case: No degree-2 PTF is ηδ-robust on these points for η = Ω(1/√ηapprox).
Theorem 6.1 follows from Theorem 6.3 and the standard fact used in establishing learning theoretic
hardness [22], namely if there were a robust learning algorithm for every distribution and ε > 0, the one could
use it on the uniform distribution over the instance from Theorem 6.3 with ε = 12N to determine whether
there exists a degree-2 PTF that has δ-robust empirical error of 0 on the points in the instance. Hence
our main goal is to prove Theorem 6.3. In order to get hardness of approximation, we need to pick the set
of points carefully. Our set of points will have the property that in the YES case of the QP instance, the
polynomial xTAx− z will be δ robust at all the points (see Claim 6.6). Furthermore, the points will enforce
the property that any other degree-2 PTF that classifies the points correctly will have to be very close to
xTAx− z in terms of the parameters. This will help use rule out the existence of an ηδ robust classifier in
the NO case, since if one exists, it must be close to xTAx− z, thereby implying an upper bound on the value
of xTAx around the neighborhood of zero. This is established in the following key lemma.
Lemma 6.4. Let p(x, z) = xTAx− z be a given polynomial where A is a symmetric matrix with zeros on
the diagonal. For any ε, δ < 1/10, consider the labeled set S = S1 ∪ S2 ∪ S3 ∪ S4 ∪ S5 where,
S1 = {((0, 1),−1), ((0,−1),+1), ((0, τ ′),−1), ((0,−τ ′),+1), ((0, 2δ),−1), ((0,−2δ),+1)},
S2 = {((ei, γ),−1), ((ei,−γ),+1), ((−ei, γ),−1), ((−ei,−γ),+1)}, ∀i ∈ [n],
S3 = {((ei,j , 2),−1), ((e−i,j , 2),−1), ((ei,−j , 2),−1), ((e−i,−j , 2),−1)}, ∀i 6= j ∈ [n],
S4 = {((2ei,j , 1), sgn(ai,j)), ((2e−i,j , 1),− sgn(ai,j)), ((2ei,−j , 1),− sgn(ai,j)),
((2e−i,−j , 1), sgn(ai,j))}, ∀i 6= j ∈ [n],
and
S5 = {((ei,j ,−2),+1), ((e−i,j ,−2),+1), ((ei,−j ,−2),+1), ((e−i,−j ,−2),+1)}, ∀i 6= j ∈ [n],
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Here ei is the vector (0, 0, . . . , τ, 0, . . . , 0) and ei,j is the vector (0, 0, . . . , 1√2(ε+|ai,j |) , 0, . . . ,
1√
2(ε+|ai,j |)
, 0, . . . , 0).
For every general degree 2 polynomial q′(x, z) with the coefficient of z = cz, such that sgn(q′) has zero error
on S, we must have cz 6= 0. Moreover, let q(x, z) = 1−cz q′(x, z) = xTA′x+ cT1 x+ c2z2 − z + c4 +
∑
i βizxi,
where A′ be a symmetric matrix. Then we must have that
max(|c2|, ‖β‖∞, |a′i,i|) ≤ ε,
|c4| ≤ 4δ,
|c1,i| ≤ min
j 6=i
8δ
√
ε+ |ai,j |,
and
1
4 − δ −
ε
4 ≤ max(
|a′i,j |
ε+ |ai,j | ) ≤ 2 + 4δ + ε
provided τ ′ = Ω(n2ε ) max(1, 1/(ε+ mini 6=j |ai,j |)), τ = Ω(nε ) max(1, 1/(ε+ mini6=j |ai,j |)), γ = 4nτ .
We first prove Theorem 6.3 assuming the lemma above and finally end the section with the proof of the
lemma.
Proof of Theorem 6.3. Given an n× n symmetric matrix A with zeros on diagonals and given s > 100, we
assume that the following cases are hard to distinguish for some ηapprox > 1,
YES Case: maxx∈{−1,1}n xTAx < s.
NO Case: maxx∈{−1,1}n xTAx > sηapprox. The reduction from the instance of the QP problem is sketched
below. Next we establish completeness and soundness of the reduction.
1. Scale the entries of A such that each non zero entry is greater than 10. Scale s by the same factor.
Set δ = 1/s and ε = 200/n2.
2. Generate the labeled point set S in Rn+1 as specified in Lemma 6.4 with τ ′ = Ω(n2ε ) max(1, 1/(ε+
mini6=j |ai,j |)), τ = Ω(nε ) max(1, 1/(ε+ mini6=j |ai,j |)), γ = 4nτ .
Figure 3: Reduction from the QP problem.
NO Case: The following claim captures the soundness analysis of the reduction.
Claim 6.5. There does not exist an ηδ-robust degree-2 polynomial on S for η = Ω(1/√ηapprox).
Proof. We will prove by contradiction. Let q(x, z) = xTA′x+ cT1 x+ c2z2− z+ c4 +
∑
i βizxi be an ηδ-robust
polynomial on S.2 The fact that q is correct on (0, 2δ) gives us
4c2δ2 − 2δ + c4 < 0 (12)
Furthermore, the fact the fact that q is ηδ-robust on (0, 2δ) gives us that
max
x∈Bn∞(0,ηδ),z∈(2δ−ηδ,2δ+ηδ)
q(x, z) < |4c2δ2 − 2δ + c4| (13)
From Lemma 6.4 this implies that
max
x∈Bn∞(0,ηδ)
xTA′x < |4c2δ2 − 2δ + c4|+ (2δ + ηδ) + 12δ + ε(2δ + ηδ)2 + nεηδ(2δ + ηδ) (14)
2We can always scale q to get it into this form.
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Substituting the value of ε we get that
max
x∈Bn∞(0,ηδ)
xTA′x < 20δ. (15)
Again using Lemma 6.4 we get that
max
x∈Bn∞(0,δ)
xTAx <
50δ
η2
. (16)
But since we are in the NO case we also know that
max
x∈Bn∞(0,δ)
xTAx > δ2sηapprox = δηapprox. (17)
This contradicts the fact that η = Ω(1/√ηapprox).
YES Case: The analysis of the YES case relies on the following claim which establishes δ-robustness of the
PTF given by p(x, z) on the point in S.
Claim 6.6. The polynomial p(x, z) = xTAx− z is δ-robust on S.
We defer the proofs of Claim 6.6 and Lemma 6.4 to Section A.1.
A Lower Bound for Weak Robust Learning. We also prove a robust lower bound that rules out the
possibility of weak robust learning with γ = 1. This hardness result allows the algorithm to output a robust
classifier that makes errors on constant fraction of the points! Hence, even when there is a degree-2 PTF that
has δ robust error of 0, it is computationally hard to output a degree-2 PTF that has δ-robust error of ε ≤ 14 .
Theorem 6.7. [Stronger Distributional Hardness] For every δ > 0 and ε ∈ (0, 14 ), assuming NP 6= RP
there is no polynomial time algorithm that given a set of N = poly(n, 1ε ) samples from a distribution D over
Rn × {−1,+1} can distinguish between the following two cases:
• Yes: There exists a degree-2 PTF that has δ-robust error of 0 w.r.t. D.
• No: There exists no degree-2 PTF that has δ-robust error at most ε w.r.t. D.
The proof of the above theorem uses non-distributional hardness in Theorem A.10. Please see Section A.2.
7 Finding Adversarial Examples for Two Layer Neural Networks
Next we use the framework in Section 4 to design new algorithms for finding adversarial examples in two
layer neural networks with ReLU activations. The description that follows applies to binary classification
and can be easily extended to multiclass classification. The binary classifier corresponding to the network
is sgn(f1(x) − f2(x)) = sgn(vTσ(Wx)) where v = v1 − v2. The optimization problem that arises is the
following: given an instance with A ∈ Rm1×n, β ∈ Rm2 , B ∈ Rm2×n, c1 ∈ Rn, c2 ∈ Rm1 , c0 ∈ R, the goal is to
find opt(A,B, β, c), defined as :
opt(A,B, β, c) := max
z:‖z‖∞≤δ
‖c2 +Az‖1 + cT1 z − ‖β +Bz‖1 + c0
= max
z:‖z‖∞≤δ
max
y:‖y‖∞≤1
yTAz + cT1 z + cT2 y −
m2∑
j=1
|βj +BTj z|. (18)
Here Bj is the jth row of B. Let c denote (c0, c1, c2), and let opt(A,B, β, c) be the optimal value of the above
problem.
To see the connection to polynomial optimization, notice that if B = 0, then the above problem is exactly
the one we considered in Section 4 in the context of degree-2 PTFs. Furthermore, if A = 0, then 18 is a linear
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1. Given instance I = (A,B, β, c) of (18), solve SDP with parameter η ∈ (0, 1):
sdp = max
∑
j∈[m1],i∈[n]
Aj,i〈vj , ui〉+
n∑
i=1
c1(i)〈ui, u0〉+
m1∑
j=1
c2(j)〈u0, vj〉 −
∑
j∈[m2]
rj + c0
s.t.∀j ∈ [m1] ‖vi‖2 ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ { 1, . . . , n } ‖ui‖2 ≤ δ2, and ‖u0‖2 = 1
∀j ∈ [k2] rj ≥ (βj +
∑
j
Bj,i〈ui, u0〉), and rj ≥ −(βj +
∑
j
Bj,i〈ui, u0〉).
2. Let u⊥i , v⊥j represent the components of ui, vj orthogonal to u0. Let ε ∈ (0, 1) with ε = Ω(1)/
√
logm1.
Let ζ ∼ N(0, I) be a Gaussian vector; set ∀i ∈ { 0, 1, . . . , n } , ẑi := 〈ui, u0〉 + 1ε 〈u⊥i , ζ〉, ŷj :=〈vj , u0〉+ ε〈v⊥j , ζ〉.
3. Repeat rounding with poly(n) random choices of ζ and pick the best choice.
Figure 4: The SDP-based algorithm for Problem (18).
program. However, the presence of both the terms involving A and B make 18 a challenging optimization
problem. Next we discuss how the problem is related to finding adversarial examples for 2-layer neural
networks. A two layer neural network with ReLU gates is given by parameters (v1, v2,W ) and outputs
f1(x) = vT1 σ(Wx), f2(x) = vT2 σ(Wx) where x ∈ Rn, v1, v2 ∈ Rk and W ∈ Rk×n. Here σ : Rm → Rm is a
co-ordinate wise non-linear operator σ(y)i = max { 0, yi } for each i ∈ [m]. The classifier corresponding to the
network is sgn(f1(x)− f2(x)) = sgn((v1 − v2)Tσ(Wx)) = sgn(vTσ(Wx)).
Our algorithm for solving (18) given in Figure 4 is inspired by Algorithm 1 for polynomial optimization.
However, the rounding algorithm differs because the variables yj and variables zi serve different purposes in
(18), and we need to simultaneously satisfy different constraints on them to produce a valid perturbation.
Moreover when the SDP is negative, then this gives a certificate of robustness around x.
We remark that one can obtain provable guarantees similar to Theorem 5.2 for Algorithm 4 under certain
regularity conditions about the SDP solution. However, this is unsatisfactory as this depends on the SDP
solution to the given instance, as opposed to an explicit structural property of the instance. Obtaining
provable guarantees of the latter kind is an interesting open question. The following proposition holds in a
more general setting where there can be an extra linear term as described below.
Proposition 7.1. Let γ ≥ 1. Suppose there is an algorithm that given an instance of problem (18) finds
a solution ẑ, ŷ with ‖ẑ‖∞ ≤ γδ, ‖ŷ‖∞ ≤ 1 such that ŷTAẑ + cT1 ẑ + cT2 yˆ − ‖β + Bẑ‖1 + c0 > 0 when
opt(A,B, β, , c) > 0, then there is a polynomial time algorithm that given a classifier sgn(f(x)) corresponding
to a two layer neural net where f(x) := vTσ(Wx) + (v′)Tx and an example x∗, guarantees to either (a) find
an adversarial example in the `∞ ball of γδ around x∗, or (b) certify the absence of any adversarial example
in the `∞ ball of δ.
Proof. Let `(x∗) = sgn(f(x∗)). We first observe that σ(yj) = 12 (|yj | + yj), and σ(Wx)j = 12 (|〈Wj , x〉| +〈Wj , x〉), whereWj is the jth row ofW . We want to find a ẑ with ‖ẑ‖∞ ≤ γδ, such that (−`(x∗))f(x∗+ ẑ) > 0,
or certify that there is no such ẑ with ‖ẑ‖∞ ≤ δ.
Let S+ = { j ∈ [k] : −`(x∗)vj ≥ 0 } and S− = [k] \S+ and let k1 = |S+|. We now split the rows of W into
two (A and B) as follows: for every j ∈ S+, define the row Aj := 12 |vj |Wj ; otherwise let Bj := 12 |vj |Wj .
−`(x∗)f(x∗ + z) = 12
∑
j∈S+
|vj ||〈Wj , x∗ + z〉|+ 12 〈vTW,x∗ + z〉 − 12
∑
j∈S−
|vj ||〈Wj , x∗ + z〉|
= max
y∈{−1,1 }k1
∑
j∈S+
yj〈Aj , x∗ + z〉 −
∑
j∈S−
|〈Bj , x∗ + z〉|+ cT1 z + c0,
where cT1 = 12vTW + (v′)T and c0 =
1
2v
TWx∗ are constants. Since the dependence on y is linear we also get
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by substituting c2 := Ax∗, β := Bx∗,
max
‖z‖∞≤δ
(−`(x∗))f(x∗ + z) = max
‖z‖∞≤δ
max
y:‖y‖∞≤1
∑
j∈S+
yj〈Aj , z〉+ cT2 y + cT1 z −
∑
j∈S−
|βj + 〈Bj , z〉|+ c0,
as required. Now the proposition follows from the same argument as in Proposition 4.1.
8 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the SDP based rounding algorithm outlined in Figure 4
to generate adversarial examples for depth-2 neural networks with ReLU gates, and compare it with the
projected gradient descent(PGD) based attack of Madry et al. [26]. We will show that our approach indeed
finds more adversarial examples. This however, comes at a computational cost since we need to solve one
SDP per example and per pair of classes. We use the MNIST data set and our two layer neural network
has d = 784 input units, k = 1024 hidden units and 10 output units. This leads to an SDP with d+ k + 1
vector variables. On an standard desktop with Intel i5 4590 processor, and 4 cores 3.30GHz, solving one
SDP instance takes 200 seconds on average. As a consequence we perform our experiments on randomly
chosen subsets of the MNIST data set. Another optimization we perform for computational reasons is that
given an example x with predicted class i, rather than checking for every class j, if one can find an attack
example z that misclassifies x+ z to be in class j, we simply pick j to be the class label of the second highest
prediction at x. Hence, the numbers we report below are an underestimate of the effectiveness of the full
SDP based algorithm
We compare the effectiveness of our attack in finding adversarial examples when compared to the the
PGD based attack of Madry et al. [26]. We consider two settings of the parameter δ, the maximum amount
by which each pixel can be perturbed to produce a valid attack example. As in [26] we first choose δ = 0.3
and train a robust 2-layer network using the algorithm of Madry et al. [26]. We then run the PGD attack and
divide the test set into examples where the PGD attack succeeds (PGDPass) and examples where the PGD
attack fails (PGDfail). We then run our attack on batches of random subsets chosen from each set. In the
algorithm we set δ′ = αδ for a hyperparameter α ≤ 1. This is because we want to ensure that the rounded
solutions have `∞ norm of at most δ. In our experiment we set α = 0.07. The first row of Table 1 shows
the precision and recall of our method. We report the average and the standard deviation across the chosen
batches. As one can see, our method has very high recall, i.e., whenever the PGD attack succeeds, our SDP
based algorithm also finds adversarial examples. Furthermore, on examples where the PGD attack fails, our
method is still able to discover new adversarial examples 30% of the time. Please see Figure 5 for the images
corresponding to some of the examples where the SDP based attack succeeds, but the PGDattack fails and
Figure 6 for the images of some examples where both the PGDattack and SDP based attack succeed. A
visual inspection of both the figures reveals that our attack often produces sparse targeted attacks as opposed
to PGDattack.
We repeat the same methodology with δ = 0.01, α = 0.2. Here we notice that PGD attack succeeds on
only 138 test examples and hence we can afford to run our attack on all of them. As can be seen from the
second row of Table 1 our attack succeeds on all of these examples. Furthermore, we rank the examples in
PGDfail according to the difference of the highest and the second highest of the ten network outputs. The
smaller the difference, the easier it should be to find an adversarial example. Indeed as can be seen from the
table, our method finds 45 new adversarial examples out of the first 100 such ranked examples.
The experiments above suggest that our algorithms can lead to improved adversarial attacks. We would
like to note that the recent work of [31] also studied semi-definite programming based methods for providing
adversarial certificates for 2-layer neural networks. However, our SDP as outlined is Figure 4 is strictly
stronger. In particular, the SDP of [31] is independent of the given example x and as a result we expect our
method to produce better certificates. We leave as future work the task of making our theoretical analysis
practical for large scale applications.
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Figure 5: The figure shows three MNIST random samples from PDGfail (i.e., examples where PGDattack
failed to find an adversarial perturbation), where SDPattack successfully finds adversarial perturbations for
δ = 0.3. The images in the first column represent the original images corresponding to three, the second
column represents the perturbed images produced by the failed PGDattack, and perturbed images produced
by the successful SDPattack. Visual inspection of these examples suggest that our method often produces
sparse targeted perturbations.
δ = 0.3 PGDpass (6 × 50 random samples) PGDfail (8 × 100 random samples)
SDP succeds 297 out of 300 total 244 out of 800 total
Mean : 49.5 of 50, Std : 0.76 Mean 30.6 of 100, Std : 2.87
δ = 0.01 PGDpass (138 samples) PGDfail (100 ranked)
SDP succeeds 138 45
Table 1: For δ = 0.3, we report mean and standard deviation of number of adversarial examples found by
running our SDPattack algorithm on 6 batches of 50 random examples from PGDpass and 8 batches of 100
random samples from PGDfail. For δ = 0.01, we run SDPattack on all 138 examples in PGDpass and first
100 sorted examples from PGDfail.
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Figure 6: The figure shows three MNIST random samples from PDGpass (i.e., examples where PGDattack
succeeded to find an adversarial perturbation), where SDPattack successfully finds adversarial perturbations
for δ = 0.3. The images in the first column represent the original images corresponding to three, the second
column represents the perturbed images produced by the successful PGDattack, and perturbed images
produced by the successful SDPattack. Visual inspection of these examples suggest that our method often
produces sparse targeted perturbations.
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9 Future Directions
Design of polynomial time algorithms that provably achieve adversarial robustness is an important direction of
research. Several open questions remain to be explored further. In Section 5 we provide a general algorithmic
framework for designing polynomial time robust algorithms. It would be interesting to use our framework to
design robust algorithms for general degree-d PTFs. While there are algorithms to approximately maximize
degree-d polynomials, they focus on the homogeneous case which does not suffice for our purposes. Another
important direction for future work is to convert our adversarial attack algorithm for 2-layer neural networks
into a provably robust learning algorithm via the framework of Section 5. A straightforward invocation of the
framework does not lead to a convex constraint set. It would also be interesting to design provable adversarial
attacks for higher depth networks. Finally, our experimental results suggest that making our SDP based
attack work on a large scale could lead to improved adversarial attacks.
Acknowledgements
The second and third authors were supported by the National Science Foundation (NSF) under Grant
No. CCF-1652491 and CCF-1637585. Additionally, the second author was funded by the Morrison Fellowship
from Northwestern University.
References
[1] Noga Alon, Konstantin Makarychev, Yury Makarychev, and Assaf Naor. Quadratic forms on graphs.
Inventiones mathematicae, 163(3):499–522, 2006.
[2] Noga Alon and Assaf Naor. Approximating the cut-norm via grothendieck’s inequality. In Proceedings
of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pages 72–80. ACM, 2004.
[3] Sanjeev Arora, Eli Berger, Hazan Elad, Guy Kindler, and Muli Safra. On non-approximability for
quadratic programs. In Foundations of Computer Science, 2005. FOCS 2005. 46th Annual IEEE
Symposium on, pages 206–215. IEEE, 2005.
[4] Idan Attias, Aryeh Kontorovich, and Yishay Mansour. Improved generalization bounds for robust
learning. arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.02180, 2018.
[5] Aharon Ben-Tal and Arkadi Nemirovski. Robust solutions of uncertain linear programs. Operations
research letters, 25(1):1–13, 1999.
[6] Dimitris Bertsimas and Melvyn Sim. The price of robustness. Operations research, 52(1):35–53, 2004.
[7] Chiranjib Bhattacharyya. Robust classification of noisy data using second order cone programming ap-
proach. In Intelligent Sensing and Information Processing, 2004. Proceedings of International Conference
on, pages 433–438. IEEE, 2004.
[8] Alberto Bietti, Grégoire Mialon, and Julien Mairal. On regularization and robustness of deep neural
networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.00363, 2018.
[9] Sébastien Bubeck, Yin Tat Lee, Eric Price, and Ilya Razenshteyn. Adversarial examples from crypto-
graphic pseudo-random generators. arXiv preprint arXiv:1811.06418, 2018.
[10] Sébastien Bubeck, Eric Price, and Ilya Razenshteyn. Adversarial examples from computational constraints.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1805.10204, 2018.
[11] M Charikar and A Wirth. Maximizing quadratic programs: extending grothendieck’s inequality. In
Foundations of Computer Science, 2004. Proceedings. 45th Annual IEEE Symposium on, pages 54–60.
IEEE, 2004.
18
[12] Daniel Cullina, Arjun Nitin Bhagoji, and Prateek Mittal. Pac-learning in the presence of evasion
adversaries. arXiv preprint arXiv:1806.01471, 2018.
[13] Dimitrios Diochnos, Saeed Mahloujifar, and Mohammad Mahmoody. Adversarial risk and robustness:
General definitions and implications for the uniform distribution. In Advances in Neural Information
Processing Systems, pages 10380–10389, 2018.
[14] Laurent El Ghaoui and Hervé Lebret. Robust solutions to least-squares problems with uncertain data.
SIAM Journal on matrix analysis and applications, 18(4):1035–1064, 1997.
[15] Alhussein Fawzi, Seyed-Mohsen Moosavi-Dezfooli, and Pascal Frossard. Robustness of classifiers: from
adversarial to random noise. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages 1632–1640,
2016.
[16] Uriel Feige, Yishay Mansour, and Robert Schapire. Learning and inference in the presence of corrupted
inputs. In Conference on Learning Theory, pages 637–657, 2015.
[17] Michael R Garey and David S Johnson. Computers and intractability, volume 29. wh freeman New York,
2002.
[18] Justin Gilmer, Ryan P Adams, Ian Goodfellow, David Andersen, and George E Dahl. Motivating the
rules of the game for adversarial example research. arXiv preprint arXiv:1807.06732, 2018.
[19] Justin Gilmer, Luke Metz, Fartash Faghri, Samuel S Schoenholz, Maithra Raghu, Martin Wattenberg,
and Ian Goodfellow. Adversarial spheres. arXiv preprint arXiv:1801.02774, 2018.
[20] Amir Globerson and Sam Roweis. Nightmare at test time: robust learning by feature deletion. In
Proceedings of the 23rd international conference on Machine learning, pages 353–360. ACM, 2006.
[21] Pascale Gourdeau, Varun Kanade, Marta Kwiatkowska, and James Worrell. On the hardness of robust
classification. arXiv preprint arXiv:1909.05822, 2019.
[22] Michael J Kearns, Umesh Virkumar Vazirani, and Umesh Vazirani. An introduction to computational
learning theory. MIT press, 1994.
[23] Justin Khim and Po-Ling Loh. Adversarial risk bounds for binary classification via function transformation.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.09519, 2018.
[24] Subhash Khot and Assaf Naor. Linear equations modulo 2 and the l1 diameter of convex bodies. In
Foundations of Computer Science, 2007. FOCS’07. 48th Annual IEEE Symposium on, pages 318–328.
IEEE, 2007.
[25] Subhash Khot and Ryan O’Donnell. Sdp gaps and ugc-hardness for maxcutgain. In Foundations of
Computer Science, 2006. FOCS’06. 47th Annual IEEE Symposium on, pages 217–226. IEEE, 2006.
[26] Aleksander Madry, Aleksandar Makelov, Ludwig Schmidt, Dimitris Tsipras, and Adrian Vladu. Towards
deep learning models resistant to adversarial attacks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1706.06083, 2017.
[27] Saeed Mahloujifar, Dimitrios I Diochnos, and Mohammad Mahmoody. The curse of concentration
in robust learning: Evasion and poisoning attacks from concentration of measure. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1809.03063, 2018.
[28] Saeed Mahloujifar and Mohammad Mahmoody. Can adversarially robust learning leverage computational
hardness? arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.01407, 2018.
[29] Yu Nesterov. Semidefinite relaxation and nonconvex quadratic optimization. Optimization methods and
software, 9(1-3):141–160, 1998.
19
[30] Ryan O’Donnell. Analysis of Boolean Functions. Cambridge University Press, New York, NY, USA,
2014.
[31] Aditi Raghunathan, Jacob Steinhardt, and Percy Liang. Certified defenses against adversarial examples.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1801.09344, 2018.
[32] Ludwig Schmidt, Shibani Santurkar, Dimitris Tsipras, Kunal Talwar, and Aleksander Madry. Adversari-
ally robust generalization requires more data. arXiv preprint arXiv:1804.11285, 2018.
[33] Pannagadatta K Shivaswamy, Chiranjib Bhattacharyya, and Alexander J Smola. Second order cone
programming approaches for handling missing and uncertain data. Journal of Machine Learning Research,
7(Jul):1283–1314, 2006.
[34] Aman Sinha, Hongseok Namkoong, and John Duchi. Certifying some distributional robustness with
principled adversarial training. 2018.
[35] Christian Szegedy, Wojciech Zaremba, Ilya Sutskever, Joan Bruna, Dumitru Erhan, Ian Goodfellow, and
Rob Fergus. Intriguing properties of neural networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.6199, 2013.
[36] Dimitris Tsipras, Shibani Santurkar, Logan Engstrom, Alexander Turner, and Aleksander Madry.
Robustness may be at odds with accuracy. 2018.
[37] Eric Wong and Zico Kolter. Provable defenses against adversarial examples via the convex outer
adversarial polytope. In International Conference on Machine Learning, pages 5283–5292, 2018.
[38] Huan Xu, Constantine Caramanis, and Shie Mannor. Robustness and regularization of support vector
machines. Journal of Machine Learning Research, 10(Jul):1485–1510, 2009.
[39] Huan Xu and Shie Mannor. Robustness and generalization. Machine learning, 86(3):391–423, 2012.
[40] Dong Yin, Kannan Ramchandran, and Peter Bartlett. Rademacher complexity for adversarially robust
generalization. arXiv preprint arXiv:1810.11914, 2018.
A Proofs for the Computational Hardness Results
A.1 Proofs of Claim 6.6 and Lemma 6.4
We first prove Claim 6.6 that helps establish the YES case.
Proof of Claim 6.6.
Proof. It is easy to check that sgn(xTAx− z) classifies all of S correctly.
Robustness at ((0, 2δ),−1). Follows from the fact that we are in the YES case and hence maxx∈Bn∞(0,δ) xTAx <
δ2s = δ.
Robustness at ((0, 1),−1), ((0, τ ′),−1), ((0,−1),+1), ((0,−τ ′),+1). Follows from the fact that we are in
the YES case and hence maxx∈Bn∞(0,δ) x
tAx < δ2s = 1/s < 1/100 and that τ ′ > n/(20δ) > 5n.
Robustness at ((0, 2δ),−1), ((0,−2δ),+1). Follows from the fact that we are in the YES case and hence
maxx∈Bn∞(0,δ) x
TAx < δ2s = δ and that εn/10 = 20δ.
Robustness at ((ei, γ),−1), ((ei,−γ),+1), ((−ei, γ),−1), ((−ei,−γ),+1). Let’s argue robustness at ((ei, γ),−1)
and the other calculations are similar. The maximum value of xTAx in a δ-ball around ei is at most
(τ + δ)δ
∑
j
|ai,j |+ δ2s.
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Hence to establish robustness we need that
(τ + δ)δ
∑
j
|ai,j |+ δ2s ≤ γ − δ. (19)
Substituting the value of δ and noticing that γ, τ are much larger than δ = 1/s < 1/100 we get that it is
enough for the following to hold
2τδ
∑
j
|ai,j | ≤ γ2 . (20)
In other words we need that
γ
τ
≥ 4δ
∑
j
|ai,j | (21)
Substituting the values of γ, τ we get that
n ≥ δ
∑
j
|ai,j | (22)
This is true since δ = 1/s and the fact that s ≥ 1n
∑
i,j |ai,j | > 1n
∑
j |ai,j | where the first inequality is
from [11].
Robustness at ((ei,j , 2),−1), ((e−i,j , 2),−1), ((ei,−j , 2),−1), ((e−i,−j , 2),−1). Let’s argue robustness at
((ei,j , 2),−1) and the other calculations are similar. The maximum value of xTAx in a δ-ball around ei,j is
at most
2δmaxi
∑
j |ai,j |√
2(ε+ |ai,j |)
+ δ2s+ 1
Hence to establish robustness we need that
2δmaxi
∑
j |ai,j |√
2(ε+ |ai,j |)
+ δ2s+ 1 ≤ 2− δ. (23)
Noticing that δ = 1/s and much smaller than 1/100, we get that it is enough for the following to hold
δmaxi
∑
j |ai,j |√
2(ε+ |ai,j |)
≤ 14 . (24)
This is again true since δ = 1/s and by our assumption |ai,j | ≥ 4 for non-zero entries of A.
Robustness at ((2ei,j , 1), sgn(ai,j)), ((2e−i,j , 1),− sgn(ai,j)), ((2ei,−j , 1),− sgn(ai,j)), ((2e−i,−j , 1), sgn(ai,j)).
We’ll argue robustness at ((2ei,j , 1),+1) and the other calculations are similar. Also for simplicity, assume
sgn(ai,j > 0. The other case is similar. The minimum value of xTAx in a δ-ball arond ei,j is at least
2− 2δmaxi
∑
j |ai,j |√
2(ε+ |ai,j |)
− δ2s
So for robustness, we need
2− 2δmaxi
∑
j |ai,j |√
2(ε+ |ai,j |)
− δ2s > 1 + δ
This is true since we have
δmaxi
∑
j |ai,j |√
2(ε+ |ai,j |)
≤ 14 .
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Proof of Lemma 6.4. We now prove the key lemma that is used in the analysis of our reduction.
Proof. First we prove that if q′(x, z) has zero error on S then cz must be non zero. Then it is clear that if
q′(x, z) has zero error on S, then so does q(x, z). Consider the case when cz = 0. Now q′(x, z) classifies S1
correctly. More specifically, it classifies the two points ((0, 1),−1) and ((0,−1), 1) correctly. This gives us the
following equations
c2 + c4 < 0
c2 + c4 > 0
and hence we get a contradiction. Moving on to the main part of the proof about the coefficients of q(x, z),
the constraints at (0, 1), (0,−1), (0, τ ′), (0,−τ ′) give us
c2 − 1 + c4 < 0 (25)
c2 + 1 + c4 > 0 (26)
τ ′2c2 − τ ′ + c4 < 0 (27)
τ ′2c2 + τ ′ + c4 > 0 (28)
From (25) and (26) we get that
−1 < c2 + c4 < 1 (29)
Similarly, from (27) and (28) we get that
−τ ′ < τ ′2c2 + c4 < τ ′ (30)
This implies that |c2| < 1/(τ ′ − 1) < ε/10 for τ ′ = Ω(1/ε).
The constraints at ((0, 2δ),−1), ((0,−2δ) gives us that
4c2δ2 − 2δ + c4 < 0
4c2δ2 + 2δ + c4 > 0
From the above equations we get that
|c4| ≤ c2(2δ)2 + 2δ < 4δ. (31)
The constraints at (ei, γ), (−ei, γ), (ei,−γ), (−ei,−γ) give us
τ2a′i,i + τc1,i + c2γ2 − γ + c4 + τγβi < 0 (32)
τ2a′i,i − τc1,i + c2γ2 − γ + c4 − τγβi < 0 (33)
τ2a′i,i + τc1,i + c2γ2 + γ + c4 − τγβi > 0 (34)
τ2a′i,i − τc1,i + c2γ2 + γ + c4 + τγβi > 0 (35)
From (32) and (35) we get that
τc1,i < γ (36)
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Similarly, from (33) and (34) we get that
τc1,i > −γ (37)
Plugging back into the equations above we get that
−(4δ + 2γ + γ
2
τ ′ − 1) < τ
2a′i,i + τγβi < (4δ + 2γ +
γ2
τ ′ − 1) (38)
and
−(4δ + 2γ + γ
2
τ ′ − 1) < τ
2a′i,i − τγβi < (4δ + 2γ +
γ2
τ ′ − 1) (39)
This implies that
|a′i,i| ≤
1
τ2
(4δ + 2γ + γ
2
τ ′ − 1) ≤ ε/10
for τ ′ = Ω(n2ε ) max(1, 1/mini,j |ai,j |), τ = Ω(nε ) max(1, 1/mini,j |ai,j |), γ = 4nτ . We also get that
|βi| ≤ 1
τγ
(4δ + 2γ + γ
2
τ ′ − 1) ≤ ε/10
for τ ′ = Ω(n2ε ) max(1, 1/mini,j |ai,j |), τ = Ω(nε ) max(1, 1/mini,j |ai,j |), γ = 4nτ .
The constraints at (ei,j , 2), (e−i,j , 2), (ei,−j , 2), (e−i,−j , 2) give us
a′i,i
2a˜i,j
+
a′j,j
2a˜i,j
+
a′i,j
a˜i,j
+ c1,i√
2a˜i,j
+ c1,j√
2a˜i,j
+ 4c2 − 2 + c4 + 2βi√2a˜i,j + 2βj√2a˜i,j < 0 (40)
a′i,i
2a˜i,j
+
a′j,j
2a˜i,j
− a
′
i,j
a˜i,j
− c1,i√
2a˜i,j
+ c1,j√
2a˜i,j
+ 4c2 − 2 + c4 − 2βi√2a˜i,j + 2βj√2a˜i,j < 0 (41)
a′i,i
2a˜i,j
+
a′j,j
2a˜i,j
− a
′
i,j
a˜i,j
+ c1,i√
2a˜i,j
− c1,j√
2a˜i,j
+ 4c2 − 2 + c4 + 2βi√2a˜i,j − 2βj√2a˜i,j < 0 (42)
a′i,i
2a˜i,j
+
a′j,j
2a˜i,j
+
a′i,j
a˜i,j
− c1,i√
2a˜i,j
− c1,j√
2a˜i,j
+ 4c2 − 2 + c4 − 2βi√2a˜i,j − 2βj√2a˜i,j < 0 (43)
where a˜i,j = ε+ |ai,j |. Combining (40) and (43) we get
a′i,i
2a˜i,j
+
a′j,j
2a˜i,j
+
a′i,j
a˜i,j
+ 4c2 − 2 + c4 < 0 (44)
From this we get that
a′i,j
a˜i,j
< 2 + 4δ + 4 ε10 +
4δ + 2γ + γ
2
τ ′−1
τ2 mini,j |ai,j | < 2 + 4δ + ε (45)
for large enough τ . Similarly, combining (41) and (42) we get
a′i,i
2a˜i,j
+
a′j,j
2a˜i,j
− a
′
i,j
a˜i,j
+ 4c2 − 2 + c4 < 0 (46)
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From this we get that
a′i,j
a˜i,j
> −2− 4δ − ε. (47)
The constraints at (ei,j ,−2), (e−i,j ,−2), (ei,−j ,−2), (e−i,−j ,−2) give us
a′i,i
2a˜i,j
+
a′j,j
2a˜i,j
+
a′i,j
a˜i,j
+ c1,i√
2a˜i,j
+ c1,j√
2a˜i,j
+ 4c2 + 2 + c4 +
2βi√
2a˜i,j
+ 2βj√
2a˜i,j
> 0 (48)
a′i,i
2a˜i,j
+
a′j,j
2a˜i,j
− a
′
i,j
a˜i,j
− c1,i√
2a˜i,j
+ c1,j√
2a˜i,j
+ 4c2 + 2 + c4 − 2βi√2a˜i,j + 2βj√2a˜i,j > 0 (49)
a′i,i
2a˜i,j
+
a′j,j
2a˜i,j
− a
′
i,j
a˜i,j
+ c1,i√
2a˜i,j
− c1,j√
2a˜i,j
+ 4c2 + 2 + c4 +
2βi√
2a˜i,j
− 2βj√
2a˜i,j
> 0 (50)
a′i,i
2a˜i,j
+
a′j,j
2a˜i,j
+
a′i,j
a˜i,j
− c1,i√
2a˜i,j
− c1,j√
2a˜i,j
+ 4c2 + 2 + c4 − 2βi√2a˜i,j − 2βj√2a˜i,j > 0 (51)
Combining (40) and (49) we get
a′i,j
a˜i,j
+ c1,i√
2a˜i,j
− 2 + 2βi√
2a˜i,j
< 0 (52)
From this we get that
c1,i < (4δ + ε)
√
2a˜i,j (53)
for large enough τ . Similarly, from (50) and (42) we get
c1,i > −(4δ + ε)
√
2a˜i,j . (54)
Finally, the constraints at (2ei,j , 1), (2e−i,j , 1), (2ei,−j , 1), (2e−i,−j , 1) give us
2
a′i,i
a˜i,j
+ 2
a′j,j
a˜i,j
+ 4
a′i,j
a˜i,j
+ 2c1,i√
2a˜i,j
+ 2c1,j√
2a˜i,j
+ c2 − 1 + c4 + 4βi√2a˜i,j + 4βj√2a˜i,j > 0 (55)
2
a′i,i
a˜i,j
+ 2
a′j,j
a˜i,j
− 4a
′
i,j
a˜i,j
− 2c1,i√
2a˜i,j
+ 2c1,j√
2a˜i,j
+ c2 − 1 + c4 − 4βi√2a˜i,j + 4βj√2a˜i,j < 0 (56)
2
a′i,i
a˜i,j
+ 2
a′j,j
a˜i,j
− 4a
′
i,j
a˜i,j
+ 2c1,i√
2a˜i,j
− 2c1,j√
2a˜i,j
+ c2 − 1 + c4 + 4βi√2a˜i,j
− 4βj√
2a˜i,j
< 0 (57)
2
a′i,i
a˜i,j
+ 2
a′j,j
a˜i,j
+ 4
a′i,j
a˜i,j
− 2c1,i√
2a˜i,j
− 2c1,j√
2a˜i,j
+ c2 − 1 + c4 − 4βi√2a˜i,j − 4βj√2a˜i,j > 0 (58)
Combining (55) and (58) we get
2
a′i,i
a˜i,j
+ 2
a′j,j
a˜i,j
+ 4
a′i,j
a˜i,j
+ c2 − 1 + c4 > 0 (59)
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From this we get that
a′i,j
a˜i,j
>
1
4 − δ −
ε
4 (60)
for large enough τ . Similarly, combining (56) and (57) we get
2
a′i,i
a˜i,j
+ 2
a′j,j
a˜i,j
− 4a
′
i,j
a˜i,j
+ c2 − 1 + c4 < 0 (61)
From this we get that
a′i,j
a˜i,j
> −14 − δ −
ε
4 (62)
for large enough τ .
A.2 Proof of Weak Robust Learning
In this section we prove Theorem 6.3, which in turns uses the non-distributional hardness in Theorem A.10.
But to begin with we first prove an alternate NP hardness result. Although weaker than the hardness result
of the previous section, this will help us prove the more robust bound. More formally, we will prove that
Theorem A.1. [Hardness] For every δ > 0, assuming NP 6= RP there is no polynomial time algorithm that
given a set of N = O(n2) labeled points { (x(1), y(1)), . . . , (x(N), y(N)) } with (x(j), y(j)) ∈ Rn+1 × {−1, 1 } for
all j ∈ [N ] can determine whether there exists a degree-2 PTF that has δ-robust empirical error of 0 on these
N points.
The above theorem immediately implies the following result about hardness of optimal robust learning of
degree-2 PTFs.
Corollary A.2. [Distributional Hardness] For every δ > 0, there exists an ε > 0 such that assuming
NP 6= RP there is no algorithm that given a set of N = poly(n, 1ε ) samples from a distribution D over
Rn × {−1,+1}, runs in time poly(N) and distinguishes between the following two cases:
• Yes: There exists a degree-2 PTF that has δ-robust error of 0 w.r.t. D.
• No: There exists no degree-2 PTF that has δ-robust error at most ε w.r.t. D.
We again reduce from the QP problem (Problem QP) which is known to be NP hard. The reduction is
sketehced below.
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Figure 8: The figure shows the construction of a hard instance for the robust learning problem. First, points
(x(j), z(j)) are sampled randomly and staisfying z(j) = p(x(j)). Each such point is then perturbed along the
direction of the sign vector of the gradient at (xj , z(j)) to get two data points of the training set, one labeled
as +1, and the other labeled as −1.
1. Let p(x) := xTAx be the polynomial given by Problem QP, and let β, δ be the given parameters.
Set α := δ2β + δ, ρ := c3δn3/2m, for some sufficiently large constant c3 ≥ 1.
2. Using A we generate m points (x(j), z(j)) ∈ Rn+1 as follows. Sample point x(j) from N(0, ρ2)n, then
set z(j) = p(x(j)) = (x(j))TAx(j) for each j ∈ [m].
3. Define s(j) = sgn(∇p(x(j))) where the sgn(x) ∈ {−1, 1 }n refers to a vector with entry-wise signs, and
∇p stands for the gradient of p at x(j). From each (x(j), z(j)) generate (u(j), z(j)u ) = (x(j)−δs(j), z(j)+δ)
with label y(j)u = sgn(z(j)u − p(u(j))) and (v(j), z(j)v ) = (x(j) + δs(j), z(j) − δ) with label y(j)v =
sgn(z(j)v − p(v(j))).
4. Generate α (depends on δ and β from problem QP) and input the 2m+ 1 points in Rn+1 × {±1 }
given by ((u(j), z(j)u ), y(j)u ), ((v(j), z(j)v ), y(j)u ) for each j ∈ [m] and (0, α,+1) to the algorithm.
Figure 7: Reduction from the QP problem.
To argue the soundness and the completeness of our reduction, we will first analyze the robustness of
degree-2 PTFs on the 2m added labeled examples ((u(`), z(`)u ), y(`)u ) and ((v(`), z(`)v ), y(`)v ). We will show that
the “intended” PTF sgn(z − p(x)) is the unique degree-2 PTF (up to scaling) that is robust at all these 2m
points. Note that a degree-2 PTF sgn(q(x, z)) on the n+ 1 variables (x, z) may not necessarily be of the form
sgn(z − g(x)) for some degree-2 polynomial g(x). We need to rule out the existence of any other degree-2
PTF of the form sgn(q(x, z)) that is δ-robust at these points. Once we have established this, we will then
show that the “intended” PTF sgn(z − p(x)) is δ-robust at ((0, α),+1) in the Yes case, and not δ-robust at
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((0, α),+1) in the No case.
We proceed by first proving that the intended PTF sgn(z − p(x)) is robust at the 2m added examples.
Recall that the points x(j) ∈ Rn are chosen according to a Gaussian distribution with variance ρ2 in every
direction. The following lemma shows a property that holds w.h.p. for the points {x(`) : ` ∈ [m] } that will
be key in proving the robustness of sgn(z − p(x)) at the 2m added points in Lemma A.5.
Lemma A.3. There exists some universal constant C > 0 such that for any η > 0, assuming ρ ≥ Cδn3/2m/η
we have with probability at least 1− η that
∀` ∈ [m], ∀i ∈ [n], |〈Ai, x
(`)〉|
‖Ai‖1 > δ, (63)
where Ai denotes the ith row of A.
Proof. The proof follows from the following standard anti-concentration fact about Gaussians.
Fact A.4. Let x∗ be sampled from N(0, ρ2)n. Let a ∈ Rn. There exists a universal constant C > 0 such that
for any η′ > 0,
P
[
|〈a, x∗〉| ≤ C‖a‖2ρη
]
≤ η′.
Set η′ := η/(mn). Fix ` ∈ [m], i ∈ [n]. Using Fact A.4 we have with probability at least 1− η′
|〈Ai, x(j)〉| ≥ ‖Ai‖2ρη′ ≥ ‖Ai‖1√
n
· ρ · η
mn
≥ δ,
from our assumption on ρ. The lemma follows from a union bound over all ` ∈ [m], i ∈ [n].
We now prove the δ-robustness of the “intended” degree-2 PTF sgn(z − p(x)) at the 2m added points
w.h.p.
Lemma A.5. There exists constant C > 0 such that for any η > 0, assuming ρ ≥ Cδn3/2m/η, then with
probability at least 1− η, the degree-2 PTF sgn(z − p(x)) = sgn(z − xTAx) is δ-robust at all the 2m points
{ ((u(`), z(`)u ), y(`)u ), ((v(`), z(`)v ), y(`)v ) : ` ∈ [m] }.
Proof. Consider a fixed ` ∈ [m]. For convenience let x∗, z∗, u, v, zu, zv denote x(`), z(`), u(`), v(`), z(`)u , z(`)v
respectively, and let s = sgn(∇p(x(`))) ∈ {−1, 1 }n. Hence z∗ = x∗TAx∗, (u, zu) = (x∗ − δs, z∗ + δ) and
(v, zv) = (x∗ + δs, z∗ − δ). We want to prove that the points (u, zu) and (v, zv) are δ robust i.e., these points
are δ away in `∞ distance from the decision boundary of sgn(z − p(x)). We now prove the following claim:
Claim. Any point (x, z) ∈ Bn+1∞ (u, zu) is on the ‘positive’ side i.e., z − xTAx > 0.
Note that (u, zu) itself lies inside the ball, and hence the claim will show that sgn(z − xTAx) is δ-robust
at (u, zu). An analogous proof also holds that δ-robustness at (v, zv).
Proof of Claim. Let’s now define x˜ = x − x∗, z˜ = z − z∗. A simple observation is that (x, z) lies on the
opposite orthant with respect to (x∗, z∗) as s , and we have (as shown in Figure 9)
∀j ∈ [d],−2δ ≤ s(j)x˜(j) ≤ 0, and z˜ ≥ 0.
Using z∗ = p(x∗) and z˜ ≥ 0, for all (x, z) ∈ Bn+1((u, zu), δ) we have
z − p(x) = z∗ + z˜ − p(x˜+ x∗) = z˜ + p(x∗)− p(x˜+ x∗) = z˜ − 〈∇p, x˜〉 − 12 x˜
T∇2px˜
≥ −
n∑
i=1
x˜(i)
( n∑
j=1
aijx
∗(j)
)
− 12
n∑
i=1
x˜(i)
( n∑
j=1
aij x˜(j)
)
=
n∑
i=1
(−x˜(i)s(i))
∣∣∣ n∑
j=1
aijx
∗(j)
∣∣∣− 12
n∑
i=1
x˜(i)
n∑
j=1
aij x˜(j)
≥
n∑
i=1
|x˜(i)|
(∣∣∣ n∑
j=1
aijx
∗(j)
∣∣∣− δ n∑
j=1
|aij |
)
,
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Figure 9: The figure shows the radius of robustness around the point (x(i), z(i)). Any degree-2 PTF that is
δ-robust at all the data points, must take a value of +1 in the upper ball around each (x(i), z(i)) of `∞ radius
of 2δ and must take a value of −1 in the lower ball around each (x(i), z(i)) of `∞ radius of 2δ. We use this
fact to establish that such a PTF must pass through the points (x(i), z(i)).
using the fact that x˜(i)s(i) ∈ [−2δ, 0] for each i ∈ [n]. Applying Lemma A.3 we see that with probability
at least (1− η), (63) holds, and hence |〈x∗, Ai〉| > δ‖Ai‖1 for each i ∈ [n] as required. This establishes the
claim, and proves the lemma.
We now prove that the “intended” PTF sgn(z − p(x)) is the only degree-2 PTF that is robust at the
added 2m examples.
Lemma A.6. Consider any degree-2 PTF sgn(q(x, z)) that is δ-robust at the 2m labeled points { ((u(`), z(`)u ),+1) : ` ∈ [m] }
and { ((v(`), z(`)v ),−1) : ` ∈ [m] } and is consistent with their labels. Then q(x, z) = C(z − p(x)) for some
C 6= 0.
The proof of Lemma A.6 follows immediately from the following two lemmas (Lemma A.7 and Lemma A.8).
Lemma A.7. Consider any degree-2 PTF on n + 1 variables sgn(q(x, z)) that satisfies the conditions of
Lemma A.6. Then q(x(`), z(`)) = 0 for each ` ∈ [m].
Proof. Since sgn(q(u(`), z(`)u )) 6= sgn(q(v(`), z(`)v )), by the Intermediate Value Theorem,
∃γ ∈ [0, 1] s.t. (x̂, ẑ) = γ(u(`), z(`)u ) + (1− γ)(v(`), z(`)v ) and q(x̂, ẑ) = 0.
Also, since q is δ-robust at (u(`), z(`)u ) and (v(`), z(`)v ), we must have that (x̂, ŷ) is atleast δ far away in `∞
distance from both (u(`), z(`)u ) and (v(`), z(`)v ). Further by design two points are separated by exactly 2δ in
each co-ordinate (see Figure 9 for an illustration)! Hence it is easy to see that γ = 1/2 i.e., (x̂, ẑ) = (x(`), z(`))
as required.
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We now show that q(x, z) = z − p(x) is the only polynomial over (n+ 1) variables that evaluates to 0 on
all points { (x(`), z(`)) : ` ∈ [m] }. Together with Lemma A.7 this establishes the proof of Lemma A.6.
Lemma A.8. Let m > (n + 1)2 and let q : Rn+1 → R be any degree-2 polynomial with q(x(`), z(`)) = 0
for all ` ∈ [m], where z(`) = (x(`))TA∗x(`) and x(`) ∼ N(0, ρ2)n with ρ > 0. Then with probability 1,
q(x, z) = C(z − xTA∗x) for C 6= 0.
Proof. We can represent a general degree-2 polynomial q : Rn+1 → R given by
q(x, z) = xTAx+ bT1 x+ c1 + zbT2 x+ c2z2 + c3z, where x ∈ Rn, z ∈ R.
This polynomial is parameterized by a vector w = (A, b1, c1, b2, c2, c3) ∈ Rr where r =
(
n+1
2
)
+ 2n+ 3 (since
A is symmetric). Now given a point (x(`), z(`)), the equation q(x(`), z(`)) = 0 is a linear equation over the
coefficients w of q. Hence, the set of conditions q(x(`), z(`)) = 0 can be expressed as a systems of linear
equationsMw = 0 over the (unknown) co-efficients w. Hence any valid polynomial q corresponds to a solution
of the linear system Mw = 0 and vice-versa. We now describe the matrix M ∈ Rm×r. Define
f(x, z) := (1)⊕ (x1, . . . , xn)⊕ (xixj : i ≤ j ∈ [n])⊕ (x1z, . . . xnz)⊕ (z2),⊕(z) ∈ Rr,
and M` := f(x(`), z(`)) ∀` ∈ [m],
where u⊕ v refers to the concatenation of vectors u and v, and M` represents the row ` of M . In other words
f(x, z) = (1, x1, . . . , xn, x21, . . . , xjxk, . . . , x2n, x1z, . . . , xjz . . . , xnz, z2, z), where xj is the jth component of x
and z = xTA∗x. Observe that the “intended” polynomial q∗(x, z) = z − xTA∗x is a valid solution to this
system of equations. Hence, it will suffice to prove that M has rank exactly r− 1 i.e., M has full column rank
minus one. First observe that as polynomials over the formal variables x, z, all but one of the columns of f
are linearly independent – in fact the only linear dependency in f(x, z) corresponds to the column z that can
be expressed as a linear combination of degree-2 monomials {xixj : i ≤ j } since z := xTA∗x is a homogenous
degree-2 polynomial. Further the columns {xjz : j ∈ [n] } have degree 3 and z2 has degree 4. Hence excluding
the column corresponding to z, it is easy to see that the rest of the columns are linearly independent (either
they correspond to different monomials, or the degrees are different). Now define g(x, z),M ′ analogously to
f(x, z) and M respectively, without the last column that corresponds to z i.e.,
g(x, z) := (1)⊕ (x1, . . . , xn)⊕ (xixj : i ≤ j ∈ [n])⊕ (x1z, . . . xnz)⊕ (z2) ∈ Rr−1,
and M ′` := g(x(`), z(`)) ∀` ∈ [m].
From our earlier discussion, the columns of g(x, z) when seen as polynomials over the formal variables x, z
are linearly independent. Hence, it suffices to prove the following claim:
Claim: M ′ has full column rank i.e., rank of M ′ is r.
To see why the claim holds consider the first ` rows of the matrix M ′ and look at their span S(R`). If
` ≤ r − 1 then the space orthogonal to S(R`) i.e., S(R`)⊥ is non-empty. Consider any direction v in S(R`)⊥.
〈v,M ′`+1〉 = q̂(x(`+1), z(`+1)), where q̂(x, z) := 〈v, g(x, z)〉
is a non-zero polynomial of degree 2 in x, z (it is not identically zero because the columns of g(x, z) are
linearly independent as polynomials over x, z). Hence using a standard result about multivariate polynomials
evaluated at randomly chose points (See Fact A.9), we get that q̂(x(`+1), z(`+1)) 6= 0 and so 〈v,M ′`+1〉 6= 0
with probability 1. Taking a union bound over all the ` ∈ { 1, . . . , r } completes the proof.
Fact A.9. A non-zero multivariate polynomial p : Rn → R evaluated at a point x ∼ N(0, ρ2)n with ρ > 0
evaluates to zero with zero probability.
We remark that the statement of Lemma A.8 can also be made robust to inverse polynomial error by
using polynomial anti-concentration bounds (e.g., Carbery-Wright inequality) instead of Fact A.9; however
this is not required for proving NP-hardness. We now complete the proof of Theorem A.1.
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Proof of Theorem A.1. We start with the NP-hardness of QP , and for the reduction in Figure 7, we will show
that in the Yes case, we will show that there is a δ-robust degree-2 PTF (completeness), and in the No case
we will show that there is no δ robust degree-2 PTF (soundness). As a reminder, the NP-hard problem QP
is the following: given a symmetric matrix A ∈ Rn×n with zeros on diagonals, and β > 0 distinguish whether
No Case : there exists an assignment y∗ with ‖y∗‖∞ ≤ 1 such that q(y∗) = (y∗)TAy∗ > β,
Yes Case : max‖y‖∞≤1 yTAy < β.
Completeness (Yes Case): Consider the degree-2 PTF given by sgn(z − p(x)) = sgn(z − xTAx). From
Lemma A.5, we have that it is δ robust at the 2m points { ((u(`), z(`)u ), y(`)u ) : ` ∈ [m] } and { ((v(`), z(`)v ), y(`)v ) : ` ∈ [m] }
with probability at least 1− η (for η being any sufficiently small constant). Further, from multilinearity of p
we have that,
max
‖y‖∞≤δ
yTAy = δ2 max
‖y‖∞≤1
yTAy < δ2β = α− δ.
Hence (α− δ)− max
‖y‖∞≤δ
yTAy > 0,
which establishes robustness at ((0, α),+1) for sgn(z − xTAx). Hence sgn(z − p(x)) is δ-robust at the 2m+ 1
points with probability at least 1− η (for η being any sufficiently small constant).
Soundness (No Case): From Lemma A.6, we see that the degree-2 PTF given by sgn(z−p(x)) = sgn(z−xTAx)
is the only degree-2 PTF that can potentially be robust at all the 2m+ 1 points with probability 1. Again
analyzing robustness at the example ((0, α),+1), we see that from multilinearity of p,
max
‖y‖∞≤δ
yTAy = δ2 max
‖y‖∞≤1
yTAy > δ2β = α− δ.
Hence (α− δ)− max
‖y‖∞≤δ
yTAy < 0,
which shows that the degree-2 PTF sgn(z − p(x)) is not robust at (0, α). Hence there is no δ-robust degree-2
PTF at the 2m + 1 given points, with probability 1. This completes the analysis of the reduction, and
establishes the theorem.
Stronger Hardness. We now prove the robust lower bound stated below.
Theorem A.10. [Stronger Hardness] For every δ > 0 and ε ∈ (0, 27 ), assuming NP 6= RP there is no
polynomial time algorithm that given a set of N = poly(n, 1/ε) labeled points { (x(1), y(1)), . . . , (x(N), y(N)) }
in Rn+1×{−1, 1 } such that there is a degree-2 PTF with δ-robust empirical error of 0, can output a degree-2
PTF that has δ-robust empirical error of at most ε on these N points.
Proof. The proof of this theorem closely follows the proof of Theorem A.1 (the ε = 0 case), so we only point
out the differences here. The reduction uses the same gadget (Figure 7) used in Theorem A.1. The main
challenge is the soundness analysis (NO case), where we need to rule out the existence of degree-2 PTFs which
are δ-robust and consistent at all but an ε fraction of the points. To handle this, we introduce “redundancy”
by including more points (of both kinds) to ensure that even when an arbitrary ε fraction of these points
are ignored (the PTF makes errors on them), we can still use the arguments in the soundness analysis of
Theorem A.1.
Recall that our reduction (see Figure 7) generated two sets of points. We have one point of the form
(0, α) (let us denote this type as Type A) and m pairs of points { (u(`), z(`)u ), (v(`), z(`)v ) : ` ∈ [m] } which are
obtained by modifying (x(`), z(`) = p(x(`))) with x(`) generated randomly (let us denote these 2m points as of
Type B).
Set N1 := n3, N2 := 2n3. In our modified instance, we will have N1 points of Type A i.e., N1 identical
points (0, α) (note that we can also perturb these points slightly so that they are all distinct, if required).
Further, we will have N2 points of Type B i.e., we will generate N2/2 pairs of points { (u(`), z(`)u ) : ` ∈ [N2/2] }
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which are generated as described in Figure 7 after drawing x(`) ∼ N(0, ρ2)n for ` ∈ [N2/2] (here a larger
ρ = O(δn3/2N2) will suffice). Hence, we have in total N = N1 +N2 = 3n3 points.
The completeness analysis (YES case) is identical to that of Theorem A.1, as sgn(z−p(x)) will be δ-robust
at all of the N points (from Lemma A.5 and our choice of α).
We now focus on the soundness analysis (NO case). From ε < 13 and our choice of N1 and N2,
N1 > ε(N1 +N2) (64)
(1− ε)(N1 +N2) > N1 + N22 + (n+ 1)
2 (65)
From (65) and a pigeonhole argument, any subset of size (1− ε)(N1 +N2) is guaranteed to have (n+ 1)2
pairs of points of the form (u(`), z(`)u ) and (v(`), z(`)v ). This is because the LHS of (65) represents a lower
bound on the number of points the candidate degree-2 PTF is robust on. The RHS of (65) represents the
number of points needed to ensure that atleast (n + 1)2 pairs of points from Type B are picked. Hence
using Lemma A.6 along with a union bound over all the
(
N2
(n+1)2
)
choices of the pairs (note that the failure
probability in Lemma A.8 is 0), the “intended” PTF sgn(z − p(x)) is the only surviving degree-2 PTF.
Again from (64) and the pigeonhole principle, any (1− ε) fraction of the points will contain atleast one
point of the Type A i.e., (0, α). Hence in the NO case, the “intended” PTF sgn(z − p(x)) is not δ-robust.
This completes the soundness analysis and establishes the theorem.
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